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| Countering Negotiation Power Asymmetries with the Adjusted Winner Algorithm? |
Despite considerable interest in the improvement of negotiation results, commercial
negotiations rarely follow formal negotiation procedures. This study investigates the
relationship between bargaining power shift and success in a formalized negotiation
experiment. Results of an experiment that addresses issue authority as a proxy of bargaining
power show that differences in issue authority allocation significantly affect negotiation
success. In scenarios with substantial differences in bargaining power, particularly female and
mixed dyads failed to achieve a mutually satisfactory result. This study investigates whether
mathematical negotiation procedures will guide the parties to an efficient negotiation result
and thus dilute these differences. Results show that (a) an increase in issue authority for one
of the two parties does not necessarily lead to an increase in negotiation efficiency and (b) the
use of mathematical formal negotiation procedures eminently improves the results and helps
to overcome the difficulty of unsatisfying results. These differences demonstrate that
bargaining power in commercial negotiations does not compensate for insufficient negotiation
skill or effort. On the contrary, unbalanced bargaining power decreases the likelihood of
success. |
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| Autor |
Prof. Dr. Ralf Wagner
Katrin Bloch |
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| Artikel | | Fachbereich | | Fachrichtung | | 2011 | | Betriebswirtschaftslehre | | Marketing/Absatz |
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| Schlagwörter |
| Power and Status in Conflict, Negotiation Processes, Games and Social Dilemmas |
