Autor: Prof. Dr. Ernst Fehr
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A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence
This paper presents an experimental examination of the Falkinger (1996) mechanism for overcoming the free-rider problem. The basic idea of the mechanism is that deviations from the mean contribution (...)
A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding (...)
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate (...)
Does Money Illusion Matter?
Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal or in real terms. To examine the behavioral impact of money illusion we studied the (...)
The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy
Economics and game theory are based on the assumption that people are capable of predicting
others' actions. The most fundamental solution concepts in Game Theory ? Nash equilibrium,
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus (...)
The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences
A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel
In a recent paper Engelmann and Strobl claim that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is far more important than inequity aversion. Here (...)
Loss Aversion and Labor Supply
In many occupations workers? labor supply choices are constrained by institutional rules regulating labor time and effort provision. This renders explicit tests of the neoclassical theory of labor (...)
Money Illusion and Coordination Failure
Economists long considered money illusion to be largely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms, (...)
A Nation-Wide Laboratory Examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioral experiments into representative surveys
Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and self-selection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error and by the questionability of their (...)
The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives ? Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs
We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the (...)
Fairness, Errors and the Power of Competition
One of the most basic questions in economics concerns the effects of competition on market prices. We show that the neglect of both fairness concerns and decision errors prevents a satisfactory (...)
Limited Rationality and Strategic Interaction, The Impact of the Strategic Environment on Nominal Inertia
The evidence from many experiments suggests that people are heterogeneous with regard to their abilities to make rational, forward looking, decisions. This raises the question when the rational types (...)
Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High?
Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
The canonical model of life-cycle labor supply predicts a positive response of labor supplied to transitory wage changes. We tested this prediction by conducting a randomized field experiment with (...)
Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fairness?
Evidence from Russia
This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjects earned between (...)
Fairness in the Labour Market - A Survey of Experimental Results
In this chapter we provide a selective survey of experiments to investigate the potential of social motivations in explaining labour market phenomena. We argue that laboratory experiments are a (...)
Why Social Preferences Matter ? The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives
A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solely motivated by material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of (...)
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity ? Evidence and Economic Applications
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have (...)
Psychological Foundations of Incentives
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically (...)
Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation?
On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism
In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the (...)
Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences
Neuroeconomics merges methods from neuroscience and economics to better understand how the human brain generates decisions in economic and social contexts. Neuroeconomics is part of the general quest (...)
Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms
We examine the characteristics and the relative strength of third party sanctions in a series of experiments. We hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our (...)